We examine the value consequences of corporate social responsibility through the lens of institutional shareholders. We find a sharp asymmetry between corporate policies that mitigate the firm's exposure to environmental risk and those that enhance its perceived environmental friendliness ("greenness"). Institutional investors shun stocks with high environmental risk exposure, which we show have higher systematic risk and lower valuations as predicted by risk management theory. These findings suggest that corporate environmental policies that mitigate environmental risk exposure create shareholder value. In contrast, firms that increase greenness do not create shareholder value and are also shunned by institutional investors.
"
The social responsibility of a business is to increase its profits. " Milton Friedman (1970) .
I. Introduction
Friedman's well-known statement reflects a widely-held view that only "sociallyresponsible" investors benefit directly from corporate actions that are deemed socially responsible. However, not all socially responsible policies are equally created. For example, socially responsible corporate actions that mitigate the likelihood of "bad" outcomes may reduce the risk exposure of firms to accidents, lawsuits, fines, etc., and thereby appeal to all investors. In contrast, actions that enhance the firm's perceived corporate social responsibility through investments that go beyond both legal requirements and any conceivable risk management rationale may be value decreasing and shunned by investors whose sole objective is profit maximization. However, the current literature does not focus on such nuances in socially responsible policies, nor provide much insight into how the form of corporate social responsibility influences the breadth and depth of ownership, and firm value.
In this paper, we study the relation between corporate environmental performance, institutional ownership, and shareholder value in a sample of U.S. firms.
Corporate environmental policies are especially closely scrutinized by investors relative to other corporate actions that have social implications. As exemplified by recent episodes such as the 2010 British Petroleum (BP) gulf oil spill, which has cost BP well in excess of $10 billion to date in losses, damages, and fines, the financial costs and consequences of corporate environmental policies dwarf other socially relevant corporate decisions. Since institutional investors are widely recognized as being better informed and more sophisticated, 1 our institutional investor perspective follows the smart money.
We classify corporate environmental practices into two categories: (a) actions that mitigate the likelihood of "bad" outcomes by reducing the exposure of firms to environmental risk (we label this type of exposure as "toxicity"); and (b) actions that enhance the firm's perceived "greenness" through investments that go beyond both legal requirements and any conceivable risk management rationale. Examples of the former include deploying safer petroleum drilling technologies or investments that mitigate the risk of hazardous chemical releases while investments in clean technologies or renewable energy sources can serve as examples of the latter.
While both groups of environmental practices are likely to be viewed as socially responsible, our bifurcation enables new insights into the costs and benefits for investors who are not constrained by SRI norms. Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) show that firms pay substantial legal penalties and suffer corresponding market value losses following violations of environmental regulations. Consequently, investments that reduce the exposure of toxic firms to the risk of losses arising from environmental accidents, lawsuits, fines, etc., can create value for all shareholders by lowering expected costs of financial distress, financing costs, and underinvestment (Smith and Stulz (1984) , Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) ). Thus, there will be decreased interest among sophisticated investors in toxic firms, an effect that should be even more prominent if a sophisticated investor is norm-constrained.
Regarding investments in greenness, going beyond legal limits in corporate environmental policies may be value-decreasing, causing sophisticated shareholders to shy away from these stocks. Furthermore, shareholders that do not adhere to SRI norms are even less likely to invest in stocks of green firms that spend corporate resources on such environmentally friendly practices. Collectively, these criteria imply that institutional investors will have a higher propensity to invest in stocks of environmentally neutral firms relative to both toxic and green firms. Additionally, the negative effect of toxic stocks will be stronger in the subset of SRI norm-constrained institutional investors while the negative effect of green stocks will be stronger in investments of SRI normunconstrained institutions.
We follow several recent studies in the finance literature by using the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) social performance dataset to assess corporate environmental policy. 2 The KLD data provides information on corporate environmental, social, and governance characteristics to a large number of sophisticated investors (for example, money managers and institutional investors) who factor these characteristics into their investment decisions. This dataset is particularly well suited for our research since it allows us to differentiate between positive and negative environmental performance. For each stock, KLD provides seven sub-indicators for environmental strengths and seven sub-indicators for environmental concerns. 3 If the firm meets or exceeds the KLD threshold in each sub-indicator category, it is assigned a value of one, or zero otherwise.
We also account for asymmetric effects of positive and negative KLD scores and generate distinct measures for positive and negative environmental performance in our analysis. 4 Specifically, we use the total number of environmental strengths and concerns reported in the KLD data for positive and negative environmental performance, respectively. Firms that have higher negative scores have higher environmental risk exposure to losses due to accidents, lawsuits, fines, etc., relative to firms with low negative scores. A firm that takes actions to decrease its negative KLD score (for example, by reducing toxic emissions, minimizing regulatory violations, or mitigating hazardous waste exposure) will be engaging in environmental risk management actions that potentially reduce its financial costs. In contrast, actions that increase a firm's positive KLD score (for example, increasing recycling activity, switching to clean energy, or increasing environmentally-relevant communications) are likely to produce tangible social benefits and elevate the firm's standing in the eyes of green investors.
However, these actions may not produce direct financial benefits in excess of incremental costs.
3 As summarized by Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel (2009) , the seven KLD environmental strength subindicators are (sale of) environmentally beneficial products and services, pollution prevention, recycling, clean energy, communications (of environmental practices), (environmental performance of) property, plant, and equipment, and other strengths while the seven environmental concern sub-indicators are hazardous waste liabilities, recent regulatory problems, manufacture of ozone-depleting chemicals, substantial emissions of toxic chemicals, production of agricultural chemicals, contribution to climate change, and other concerns. 4 See Chatterji, Levine and Toffel (2009) for empirical evidence on this asymmetry between positive and negative KLD scores.
Accordingly, we categorize the firms in our sample into four groups with labels that reflect the above differences in their environmental performance: "green," "toxic,"
"gray," and "neutral." Green firms are positive environmental performers in the sense that they have at least one environmental strength and no environmental concerns, while toxic firms are negative environmental performers, having at least one environmental concern and no environmental strengths. Gray firms have both environmental strengths and concerns, while neutral firms have neither strengths nor concerns. The toxic and gray firms in our sample will have higher exposure to environmental risk than neutral or green firms. These classifications enable us to examine the effects of corporate environmental performance variations on ownership structure, analyst coverage, and shareholder value.
Our first major contribution is the novel evidence we provide on the formation of institutional holdings based on corporate environmental performance. Specifically, we find a non-monotonic relationship between environmental performance and institutional ownership. Both green and toxic firms have a significantly lower institutional ownership than neutral firms. The difference is made up by individual shareholders, who own green and toxic firms in significantly greater numbers than neutral firms. Collectively, these findings are consistent with our conjecture that environmental performance influences decisions of institutional investors.
Consistent with our results for aggregate institutional ownership, we also find lower numbers of institutional investors investing in green, toxic and gray firms for all institutional investor types in our sample. Norm-unconstrained institutional investors (representing banks, insurance companies, financial investment institutions and advisors)
hold significantly smaller fractions of the shares of green firms while norm-constrained institutions (representing universities, pension plans and employee stock ownership plans) hold a significantly lower percentage of shares of toxic firms. Notably, normconstrained institutions do not invest more in stocks of green companies. Collectively, these results suggest that corporate environmental practices generate a variation in stock holdings between norm-constrained and unconstrained institutional investors.
Our findings help improve the understanding of the role of social norms in investor behavior. While Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) report significant betweenindustry effects of sin and non-sin stocks, our setting permits an examination of both within-and between-industry effects. We document that within-industry variation in environmental performance has an important influence on variables of interest.
Furthermore, we consider the full spectrum of firms (including both positive and negative environmental performers) in our analysis, whereas Hong and Kacperczyk's (2009) focus on sin firms limits them to studying only bad social performers. We also observe considerable parallels in the ways institutional investors perceive sin stocks and toxic stocks. However, we find that socially unconstrained institutional investors are repelled by green firms. This finding indicates that unconstrained institutional investors do account for environmental performance in their portfolio allocations and are not indifferent to environmental performance as assumed by Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001) . In fact, this finding suggests that institutions differentiate between investments that reduce toxicity ("prevent bad") and increase greenness ("do good"), and find only the former to be consistent with the interests of unconstrained investors.
Our second major contribution is the evidence we provide on the relation between environmental risk management and shareholder value. While risk management theory (Smith and Stulz (1985); Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) ) predicts that corporate risk management creates shareholder value by reducing of the expected costs of financial distress and mitigating underinvestment, the empirical evidence on this prediction is mixed. Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that the market value of firms using foreign currency derivatives is 4.87% higher on average than for nonusers, Graham and Rogers (2002) We also contribute to studies on the preferences of analysts (Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) , Das, Guo and Zhang (2006) ). We find a significant effect of environmental performance on analyst following. Specifically, analyst coverage is significantly higher for toxic firms. This finding is consistent with the notion that institutional prudency requirements may increase the demand for analyst coverage of toxic stocks (O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) ), since these stocks are likely to have higher exposure to large fines associated with environmental non-compliance. 6 By showing a higher analyst following for toxic companies, this study suggests that analysts consider environmental performance in their stock coverage decisions. Overall, our findings suggest that in addition to investors, financial intermediaries also account for corporate environmental performance in their decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the data and our empirical methodology in the next section. Section III presents our empirical findings.
Section IV draws conclusions based on the findings.
II. Data and Methodology
We obtain our environmental performance measures from the KLD In this paper, we use the total number of environmental strengths and concerns reported in the KLD data to measure the environmental performance of the firms in our sample. Although these variables are available since 1991, the firm identification variable (CUSIP) is only available from 1996. Therefore, our analysis covers the period between 1996 and 2007. 10 Using the total number of strengths and concerns allows us to categorize firms into four groups: green, toxic, gray and neutral. Green (toxic) firms have at least one environmental strength (concern) while having no environmental concerns (strengths). Gray firms have both environmental strengths and concerns, whereas neutral firms have neither strengths nor concerns. We also define green and toxic industries.
Green (toxic) industries are industries with the percentage of green (toxic) firms greater than 10% while the percentage of toxic (green) firms within the industry is less than 10%.
These classifications enable us to examine the effects of environmental performance variations between and within industries on institutional holdings, analyst coverage, and stock market valuation and performance.
We obtain accounting measures from Compustat, stock prices from CRSP, analyst coverage from I/B/E/S, and governance variables from the IRRC dataset on governance and directors. We also extract institutional holdings measures from the CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database. As most companies file semi-annually, we confine our attention as in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) to year-end reports for institutional holdings.
Consistent with previous studies, we set institutional holdings to zero for firms that do not have institutional investors reported in the dataset. In order to alleviate concerns regarding reverse causality, we use lagged explanatory variables in our analyses. In order to eliminate outliers generated by small and narrowly held firms, we exclude firms if they have less than 500 shareholders, a stock price below $5 and a market capitalization less than $200 million. 11 The final sample has 7118 observations of 1375 distinct firms between 1997 and 2007. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. The multiple data screens that we apply to identify firms for our study results in a sample of large firms. The mean market capitalization (Market Value) of firms in our sample is $11.182 billion. Green firms constitute 9% of the sample while 13% and 7% are classified as toxic and gray firms, respectively. 17% of sample firms fall in green industries and 15% are categorized in toxic industries. The number of shareholders (NS) has a mean of 38,920 with a standard deviation of 92,700, indicating considerable variation across our sample.
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III. Empirical Results
11 We obtain similar results when we do not apply these restrictions. These results are not reported, but are available upon request. 12 Our sample starts in 1997 since the first available lagged value of environmental performance is in 1996.
Institutional investors hold 72% of the shares outstanding, on average. Analysts cover 80% of the firms in our sample, and the average number of analysts per firm is 9.15. 56%
of the firms in our sample are in the S&P 500 index.
[Place Table 1 about here] there are systematic differences across sub-samples of green, toxic, gray and neutral firms. For example, relative to neutral firms both green and toxic firms have a higher number of shareholders, lower ratios of institutional investors, and lower percentages of shares held by institutions. 13 We also find systematic differences in analyst coverage and other characteristics across the different subsamples. Gray firms have the highest analyst coverage (97%) followed by toxic firms (90%), green firms (85%) and neutral firms (76%) and we observe a similar pattern in the average number of analysts following each firm. However, we find significant differences in size and age across these different subsamples that may explain the differences in ownership, analyst coverage and stock market valuation. We control for these differences in our multivariate analysis.
A. Univariate analysis
[Place Table 2 about here]
Both green and toxic firms have higher Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003) (GIM)
indices than neutral firms, indicating poorer governance, while they also have higher likelihoods of independent boards relative to neutral firms, indicating better governance. 14 In addition, toxic firms have lower CEO/Chair duality, suggesting that managers of toxic firms are less likely to be entrenched. Collectively, the conflicting findings on corporate governance suggest that the differences generated by green and toxic firms are less likely to be driven by variations in corporate governance. Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates for our multivariate regressions of environmental performance on the breadth of ownership. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and to clustering within firm over time. In these regressions, we account for several factors that may affect the breadth of ownership. For instance, larger and older firms are more likely to attract the attention of a larger number of investors.
B. Environmental performance and institutional ownership
Thus, we include the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (Market Value) to control for the effect of firm size. 15 As older firms have established track records, they are less prone to risk and therefore, may attract a larger number of investors. In order to account for the influence of S&P 500 membership, we include a S&P500 dummy in our analysis. We use a Nasdaq dummy to control for differences across stock exchanges.
Corporate governance may potentially affect both the breadth of ownership and environmental performance. Therefore, we include a CEO/Chairman duality dummy, the GIM index and an Independent Board dummy in the regressions. 16 As market-based measures are correlated, we successively add Tobin's Q, stock return, standard deviation of stock return, turnover and the inverse of stock price in the regression. Finally, we run a regression that includes all these variables. As in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), we control for (but do not report) 1-digit SIC and year dummies in these regressions.
[Place Table 3 about here]
We find significant effects of environmental performance on the number of shareholders (NS). Specifically, green and toxic firms have 1,670 and 1,650 more investors on average, respectively, relative to neutral firms (Model 1). These are equivalent to 4.3% and 4.2% increases in NS, respectively, relative to the sample average. Gray firms also attract a larger number of investors. We continue to find significant effects of green, toxic and gray firms when we successively add market-based measures in the regression. Collectively, these findings are consistent with our univariate results, and provide strong support for our previous notion that there is a non-monotonic relationship between environmental performance and the breadth of ownership.
Several of our control variables also have explanatory power in the regressions.
We find that older and larger firms attract a larger number of investors. Furthermore, the number of shareholders is negatively related to turnover, stock price and stock return volatility. Good corporate governance practices (e.g., independent boards and CEO/Chair separation) also improve the breadth of ownership.
In order to capture the effect of environmental performance on institutional investors relative to its effect on individual investors, we conduct similar regressions for both the ratio of the number of institutional investors to the total number of shareholders, and the ratio of shares held by institutions to the total shares outstanding. Models 7-12 in Table 3 report the regressions in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of number of institutional investors to NS. Regardless of the model specification, we observe decreases in the ratio of institutional investors that are statistically significant at the 1% level when firms are classified as green or toxic. Furthermore, in an unreported analysis on sub-samples of size and Tobin's Q quartiles, we continue to find a lower ratio of institutional investors to NS. Combined with a higher number of investors investing in green and toxic stocks, these findings collectively suggest that green and toxic firms attract disproportionately more individual investors and correspondingly fewer institutional investors. Table 4 reports regressions of institutional holdings where the dependent variable is the ratio of shares held by all institutional investors to total shares outstanding. The effects of green, toxic and gray firms on total institutional holdings are negative and significant. They are also economically significant. Specifically, Model 6 documents that the share of institutional holdings in green, toxic and gray firms decrease by 2.8%, 2.8% and 3.0%, respectively, relative to neutral firms. Since the average institutional holding percentage in our sample is 72%, these decreases correspond to reductions of 3.9%, 3.9% and 4.2% for a representative firm in our sample. 17 These results are consistent with our finding of fewer institutional investors investing in green, toxic, and gray firms relative to neutral firms. Overall, these findings support our conjecture that institutional investors account for environmental performance in investment decisions.
[Place Table 4 about here]
We also observe that institutional holdings increase with turnover and stock price, which is consistent with the findings of Gompers and Metrick (2001) . Furthermore, firms listed on the S&P 500 index and firms that have higher average monthly stock returns also have larger relative institutional holdings. While firms with independent boards also attract larger institutional holdings (albeit statistically significant only at the 10% level), institutional holdings are unrelated to the GIM index or CEO/Chairman duality.
We also study the holdings of institutions differentiated by their various types.
Corporate 13-F filings report five institutional investor types: banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, independent investment advisors (for example, hedge funds)
and others (including universities, pension plans, and employee stock ownership plans).
This classification scheme allows us to test whether environmental performance influences investments of norm-constrained institutional investors, including universities, pension plans and employee stock ownership plans. 18 As the classification scheme for institution types changed after 1997, we separately report institutional holdings by various types for 1997 and 1998-2007 in Panels A and B of Table 5 , respectively.
[Place Table 5 
C. Analyst coverage
Next, we examine whether the nature of corporate environmental performance influences analyst coverage. Specifically, Table 6 presents results from regressions relating analyst coverage to environmental performance. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of the number of analysts covering the underlying stock in models 1-6 and the dummy variable for analyst coverage in models 7-12. We use OLS for the former and employ a probit specification for the latter. As coefficient estimates are hard to interpret in probit models, we report marginal effects in models 7-12.
[Place Table 6 about here]
We do not find a significant effect of green firms on the number of analysts covering a firm. In contrast, four of our six models report a significant positive effect for toxic firms, suggesting that analyst coverage is higher for toxic firms. Furthermore, gray firms also have a significantly larger number of analysts covering their stocks. Since toxic and gray stocks are more prone to environmental litigation, penalties, and other costs that lower investor returns, institutional investors are more likely to rely on analyst reports when they invest in toxic and gray stocks.
It is important to emphasize that the above results are obtained after controlling for other factors that are known to drive analyst coverage. Analyst coverage is significantly and positively related to firm size, age, and S&P 500 index membership. We also find that firms with independent boards have a higher likelihood of analyst coverage and that firms with a higher GIM index receive more analyst coverage. The relationships we document between environmental performance and analyst coverage persist after these controls.
D. The effect of industry environmental performance on institutional ownership and analyst coverage
In this section, we examine whether environmental performance of an industry affects the variables of interest. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) In order to disentangle the effects of firm and industry, we include green and toxic industry variables in the basic regressions reported in Table 7 . We continue to find that firm environmental performance measures (i.e., green, toxic, and gray) are significant, while the effects of green and toxic industry dummies are insignificant. These findings suggest that within-industry variation in corporate environmental performance is a relatively more important determinant of ownership dispersion than the variation across different industries. Furthermore, the insignificant effects of industry environmental performance and significant effects of firm environmental performance on institutional holdings and analyst coverage suggest that overall, institutional investors and analysts also pay more attention to firm environmental performance than to industry environmental performance.
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[Place Table 7 about here] 22 It is important to note that this finding reflects the overall behavior of institutional investors. In Table 5 , we document variation across different institutional investor types.
E. Corporate environmental performance and firm value
In previous sections, we document that environmental performance has economically meaningful effects on investor holdings and analyst coverage. In this section, we examine whether the nature of corporate environmental performance influences firm values. Specifically, we examine differences in stock valuations using the Tobin's Q measure. Panels A and B of [Place Table 8 about here]
We also conduct a matched sample analysis to assess the difference in valuations in Panel C of Table 8 . Specifically, we generate one-on-one matching samples of neutral firms for green, toxic and gray firms that share the same two-digit SIC. Matching firms are the closest in size from firms whose size is within +/-10% of the sample firm. We also statistically verify the efficacy of the size match. We compare Tobin's Q values of green, toxic and gray firms to a group of matched neutral firms. Panel C of We also examine the stock valuation of green firms in the multivariate regressions. Although the Green Firm Dummy has a significant negative effect in Models 1-3, the effect lacks statistical significance in Models 4-6. Collectively, these findings suggest that greenness does not increase shareholder value.
We also assess the portfolio returns of green and toxic firms. By following the matching methodology of Panel C, we form equally-weighted portfolios comprised of firms in our sample. Specifically, we calculate the net portfolio returns as the returns of green, toxic and gray portfolios minus the corresponding equally-weighted matching neutral firm portfolio returns. We then regress separately the net portfolio returns over 12 months on (a) excess market returns in the conventional market model; (b) the three factors in the Fama-French (1992) Table 9 reports the estimates from these regressions over 132 months between 1997 and 2007.
[Place Table 9 about here]
We fail to find any statistically or economically significant effect of environmental performance on net portfolio returns. Specifically, Alpha lacks statistical significance in all models. However, we find a significant influence of environmental performance on risk loadings. In particular, the green portfolio has lower risk relative to benchmark neutral firms in Model 1 while toxic and gray firms have higher risk loadings in Models 2 and 3.
Our findings on differential risk loadings support the prediction by Heinkel et al.
(2001) of a higher required return on stocks of polluting firms, and are consistent with our results on analyst coverage and institutional holdings. Toxic firms are more prone to environmental disasters, lawsuits, and other costly disruptions, which may explain both the lower institutional presence in these stocks and the higher demand for analyst coverage. While green stocks are also more widely held and have lower institutional sponsorship, green stocks have lower systematic risk compared to neutral firms.
IV. Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of corporate environmental policy on institutional holdings, analyst coverage, and shareholder value. We find a sharp asymmetry between corporate policies that affect the firm's exposure to environmental risk ("toxicity") and its perceived environmental friendliness ("greenness"). We find a non-monotonic variation in ownership across the environmental performance spectrum. Both green and toxic firms have a larger number of shareholders relative to neutral firms, but a smaller percentage of institutional holdings. There is also some variation in holdings based on environmental performance across different types of institutional investors. Our finding that institutional investors, including institutions who are unconstrained by socially responsible investment (SRI) norms, shun stocks with high environmental risk exposure, are consistent with the predictions of risk management theory and suggest that corporate environmental policies that mitigate risk exposure create value for all shareholders. Although green investors may derive non-pecuniary benefits from holding "green" stocks, our finding that institutional investors, especially those unconstrained by SRI norms, also shun firms that have high greenness scores suggest that high greenness also does not increase shareholder value. Additionally, we find that analyst following is significantly higher for toxic firms.
Collectively, these findings indicate that the "smart money" controlled by institutional investors distinguishes between and reacts differently to different forms of corporate environmental policies.
We also observe significant differences in Tobin's Q across different environmental performance groupings. Both toxic and green firms have lower values of Tobin's Q than neutral firms. Our finding that toxic firms, which have higher exposure to environmental risk, have lower valuations is consistent with the predictions of risk management theory. Collectively, these findings indicate that lower valuations of green and toxic firms persist, which is in line with the lower institutional holdings in these stocks.
This study complements the growing literature on socially responsible investment by providing a much-needed investor perspective on corporate environmental policy. Our findings provide several new insights and point to a fruitful new line of research that is likely to grow in importance as environmental performance takes a more central place in the way firms run their businesses and investors perceive them.
Appendix A -Variable Definitions
(in alphabetical order)
Advisors are independent investment advisors and correspond to institutional investor type 4 in the CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database.
Age refers to the number of years between the year of estimation and the year in which the firm is first listed in CRSP dataset.
Alpha is the intercept of monthly return on the portfolio less the one-month Treasury bill rate on Fama-French three-factors plus momentum factor.
Analyst Coverage takes value one if the firm is covered by an analyst in the I/B/E/S dataset.
Average Inst. Investor Holdings is the ratio of Fraction of Shares Held by Inst. Investors to the Number of Institutional Investors.
Average Monthly Stock Return is the mean monthly holding period return.
Banks refers to institutional investor type 1 in CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database.
Book Debt is the sum of total debt in current liabilities (Compustat item DLC) and total long-term debt (Compustat item DLTT). CEO/Chairman Dummy takes the value one if CEO is chairman of the board of directors.
EBITD/TA is operating income before depreciation (Item OIBDP) over Total Assets (Item AT).
Excess Return on Market refers to monthly return on the value-weighted market portfolio of NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX stocks less the one-month Treasury bill rate.
Fraction of Shares Held by Inst. Investors is ratio of shares held by institutional investors to shares outstanding.
GIM Index refers to the number of antitakeover provisions reported in IRRC dataset.
Gray Firm Dummy takes the value one if the firm has one or more environmental strengths as well as one or more environmental concerns.
Green Firm Dummy takes the value one if the firm has one or more environmental strengths and has no environmental concerns.
Green Industry Dummy takes value one if 10 percent or more of the industry consists of Green Firms and the percentage of Toxic Firms is less than 10 percent.
High-Minus-Low Return refers to the difference between the returns on portfolios of high-and low Book Equity/Market Equity stocks.
Independent Board Dummy takes value one if the ratio of independent board members is greater than 50 percent.
Insurance refers to insurance companies and is identified as institutional investor type 2 in the CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database.
Investment refers to mutual funds and is identified as institutional investor type 3 in the CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database.
Market Value refers market capitalization (shares outstanding (Compustat item CSHO) times stock price (Compustat item PRCC_F)).
Market Leverage is Book Debt over Total Assets minus book value of equity (Compustat item CEQ) plus Market Value of equity.
Nasdaq Dummy takes value one if the firm trades at the NASDAQ Stock Exchange.
Neutral Firm takes value one if the firm does not have any environmental strength or concerns.
Neutral Industry takes value one if the industry is not classified as Toxic or Green Industry.
Number of Analysts refer to the number of analysts covering the company.
Number of Environmental
Concerns is the number of environmental concerns reported in the KLD dataset. The concerns indicate if the firm releases hazardous waste, agriculture chemicals and ozone depleting chemicals, has regulatory problems, has substantial emissions and contributes to climate change. If the firm meets the KLD threshold in each area, it is assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise.
Number of Environmental Strengths is the number of environmental strengths reported in the KLD dataset. The sub-indicators of strengths include the extent to which the firm has environmentally beneficial products and services, uses clean energy, provides open communication about its environmental program and engages in extensive recycling. If the firm meets the KLD threshold in each area, it is assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise.
Number of Shareholders (NS) refers to number of shareholders of the company (Compustat item CSHR).
Other refers to institutional investors including pension plans, endowments and employee stock ownership plans and corresponds to institutional investor type 5 in the CDA/Spectrum 13F Holdings database.
R&D Missing Dummy is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if Compustat reports R&D expense (Compustat item XRD)
as missing, and of zero otherwise.
R&D/TA is defined as R&D expenses (Compustat item XRD) over Total Assets (Compustat item AT).
Ratio of green firms is the ratio of Green Firms in the firm's industry.
Ratio of toxic firms is the ratio of Green Firms in the firm's industry.
S&P 500 Dummy takes value one if the firm is listed in the S&P 500 Index.
Small-Minus-Big Return refers to the difference between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks
Std of Daily Stock
Return is the standard deviation of daily holding period stock returns.
Tobin's Q is the ratio of Total Assets minus book value of equity (Compustat item CEQ)
plus Market Value of equity to Total Assets.
Total Assets (TA) is measured as the book value of assets (Compustat item AT).
Toxic Firm Dummy takes value one if the firm has one or more environmental concerns and has no environmental strengths.
Toxic Industry Dummy takes value one if 10 percent or more of the industry consists of Toxic Firms and the percentage of Green Firms is less than 10 percent.
Turnover is average monthly trading volume over shares outstanding.
1/Stock Price is one over the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Table 9 Environmental Performance and Portfolio Returns This table reports the effects of firm environmental performance on portfolio returns. In Panel A, Models 1-3 have the dependent variable as long Green (monthly return for an equally-weighted portfolio of green firms) and short matched Neutral (monthly return for an equally-weighted portfolio of matched neutral firms). In Models 4-6, the dependent variable is long Toxic (monthly return for an equally-weighted portfolio of toxic firms) and short matched Neutral (monthly return for an equally-weighted portfolio of matched neutral firms). In Models 7-9, the dependent variable is long Gray (monthly return for an equally-weighted portfolio of gray firms) and short matched Neutral (monthly return for an equally-weighted portfolio of matched neutral firms). Matching is done based on industry (2-digit SIC) and size. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. The *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.
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